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I. INTRODUCTION
In Davidson v. Prince,3 the Court of Appeals of Utah, in dicta, suggested that
"courts construing Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and similar state rules have
held that evidence of statements made in settlement negotiations can and
should be admitted for purposes of impeachment."4 But this is not necessarily
so.
3813 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (reprinted in JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 430 (8th ed. 1995); noted in 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT
& KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE § 5304, at 66
n.13, § 5307, at 73 n.66, § 5314, at 90 n.60 (Supp. 1995)), cert. denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah
1991).
41d. at 1233 n.9. The court did not base its ruling on this interpretation of Rule 408,
however, but held instead that the trial court correctly admitted plaintiff's statement in
a letter to defendant's insurer, since the letter was not written as part of compromise
negotiations, and therefore Utah Rule of Evidence 408 (Identical to Federal Rule of
Evidence 408) did not apply. Id. The letter concluded: "You may speak with us directly
or we can send it to lawyers and to court, you decide." Id. at 1233. Defendant's chief
theory at trial was that plaintiff, who was attacked and gored by a stampeding steer
released from defendant's overturned cattle truck, was contributorily negligent by
comering the animal. Id. at 1232. Defendant therefore stressed the importance of the
distance between plaintiff and the steer when it charged. 813 P.2d at 1232. In deposition
testimony, plaintiff estimated the distance to be 22 feet. Id. In the letter in question,
however, plaintiff stated the distance to be "some 10 feet." Id. at 1232 n.8. This statement
was admitted, and plaintiff was found forty percent at fault. Id. at 1227. One
commentator notes that the court, in refusing to accept the letter as part of compromise
negotiation, seems divided between a temporal approach (referring to negotiations as
an event) and a functional approach (whether the purpose or intent behind the words




The question of impeaching a party by prior inconsistent statements in
compromise negotiations reflects the tension between two important policies:
accommodating the truth-finding process and furthering the policy of
encouraging settlements.5 The structure of Rule 408 leaves the question open
and the tension unresolved, 6 and this has resulted in divergent decisions 7 and
comments. 8
5 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LITIGATION, EMERGING PROBLEMS
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 60, 61 (2d ed. 1991)("To admit [settlement
statements] is, of course, inconsistent with the announced policy of encouraging
settlements. At the same time, such evidence may be quite valuable to the truth-finding
process. The few decisions note but do not purport to resolve the tension between these
two concerns.") (footnote omitted).
61d.; see also Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations,
39 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 974 (1988) (noting that courts have not formulated a consistent,
reliable body of doctrine in this area).
7 Compare EEOC v. Gear Petroleum, Inc., 948 F.2d 1542 (10th Cir. 1991)(in action
against employer pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, defendant's
subsequent letters to EEOC regarding planned mandatory retirement at age 65 were
properly excluded when offered to impeach defendant executives' testimony denying
the existence of such plans) with Freidus v. First Nat'l Bank, 928 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1991)(in
a breach of contract suit, letters exchanged between the parties during compromise
negotiations were properly admitted to impeach by specific contradiction testimony by
plaintiff's agent/husband that defendant never gave reasons for its action regarding
foreclosure).
8 See, e.g., Judge Sam Pointer, Speech at Seminar for Newly Appointed United States
District Judges, Federal Judicial Center (June, 1975), quoted in STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG &
KENNETH R. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 190 (3d ed. 1982) (suggesting
that Rule 408 would not require exclusion where "it is being offered to show a prior
inconsistent statement of a witness-to impeach a witness") (for a contrasting view, see
infra note 231); 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5314, at 287 (1980) (advocating
admission of inconsistent statements in settlement negotiations to impeach a party who
testifies, but excluding the fact "that it was made during settlement negotiations."); 2
DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 172, at 470 (1985)
(recommending admission of such evidence, but noting that "there seems to be no
authority in point."); Newell H. Blakely, Article IV: Relevancy and Its Limits, 20 Hous. L.
REV. 151, 242 (1983) (suggesting that admission of such evidence to impeach "seems to
be the better view.'). But see, e.g., MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 408.1, at 265 (2d ed. 1986) (advocating that "conduct or statements made during
compromise negotiations should not be admissible as inconsistent statements to
impeach.") (footnote omitted); 1 STEPHENA. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 351 (5th ed. 1990) (advising against admitting settlement
statements as impeachment evidence "when they are used to impeach a party who tried
to settle a case but failed.");Jane Michaels, Rule 408:A Litigation Mine Field, 19 LITIGATION
34, 37 (Fall 1992) (suggesting that admitting prior inconsistent statements for
impeachment "would eviscerate Rule 408."); Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the
Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 18 (1986) (propounding that most
courts recognize that allowing the parties to use such evidence for impeachment
purposes "would destroy" Rule 408); Jon R. Waltz & J. Patrick Huston, The Rules of
Evidence in Settlement, 5 LITIGATION 11, 16 (Fall 1978) (proposing that courts "should
almost never admit a party's bargaining statements as discrediting prior inconsistent
statements.").
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The drafters' original intent behind Rule 408 was to expand the scope of the
common law protection for offers to compromise9 and to clarify its
application. 10 However, drafting shortcomings, 11 ambiguities,12 and an
open-ended provision for exceptions 13 have contributed to increasing
9
"The practical value of the common law rule has been greatly diminished by its
inapplicability to admissions of fact.... An inevitable effect is to inhibit freedom of
communication with respect to compromise, even among lawyers." FED. R. EvID. 408
advisory committee's note (as printed at 56 F.R.D. 183,227 (1972) (citation omitted)).
10
"Another effect is the generation of controversy over whether a given statement
falls within or without the protected area. These considerations account for the
expansion of the rule herewith to include evidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations." Id.
1 1See, e.g., Waltz & Huston, supra note 8, at 16 (noting that Rules 408 and 410 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence "suffer from both under- and overdrafting"); Brazil, supra note
6, at 996 ("By leaving open the possibility that settlement communications could be
admitted for any one of an almost limitless number of other purposes, the drafters of
the rule in essence eviscerated the privilege rationale... [Tihe drafters constructed a
rule that is unfaithful to its own rationale."); SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 8, at 191
(suggesting that Rule 408 be made consistent with Rule 410 which does not allow the
use of bargaining statements for impeachment). Kristina M. Kerwin, Note, The
Discoverability of Settlement and ADR Communications: Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and
Beyond, 12 REV. LITIG. 665,669 (1993) (noting that sentences 1, 3, and 4 of Rule 408 "create
a Pandora's box of exceptions to the general exclusion of compromise evidence, which
was probably not what the drafters intended.") (footnote omitted).
12 See, e.g., Leslie T. Gladstone, Comment, Rule 408: Maintaining the Shield for
Negotiation in Federal and Bankruptcy Courts, 16 PEPP. L. REV. S237, S238 (1989) (noting
that courts are in disagreement as to the intended scope of the rule and that "the direction
of rule 408 remains unclear."); Kerw in, supra note 11, at 668 (noting that Rule 408 contains
ambiguities and gaps.).
13 See, e.g., Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation:
The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 37, 40 (1986)("[T]he exceptions are
so numerous that they almost swallow the rule as applied to mediation.'); Michaels,
supra note 8, at 37 ("In fact, the number of permissible purposes is limited only by the
ingenious minds of the litigation bar"); Gladstonesupra note 12, atS238 (acknowledging
that exceptions and loopholes within Rule 408 "potentially limit its applications."); Note,
Making Sense ofRules of Privilege Under the Structural (Il)logicof the Federal Rules of Evidence,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1339, 1348-49 (1992) [hereinafter Making Sense] ("[The exceptions] are
broad and often allow evidence perilously close to the key issue of liability.") (footnote
omitted); Kerwin, supra note 11, at 668 ("[Tjhis ['another purpose'] provision provides
great incentive to find creative ways to recharacterize compromise evidence to fit into
these exceptions."). But cf. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5308, at 238:
Although the use of compromise evidence for some permissible
purpose is customarily talked of in terms of an "exception" to the
general rule, this is, strictly speaking, incorrect. The evidence is
admissible because it is beyond the scope of the rule of exclusion,
not because of any exceptions to the rule.
(footnote omitted). However, even Chief Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York and member of the Rules Advisory
Committee, has used the term "exception" to characterize the limitations on 408's
exclusionary treatment contained in its last sentence. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL.,




apprehension about the Rule's utility 14 and a retreat to common-law
safeguarding techniques' 5 among cautious attorneys.
This note will explore the concept of compromise and the public policy in
furtherance of compromise and settlement, and then discuss whether Rule 408,
in its current form, is maximizing its potential to effectively serve that public
policy. The note concludes that an amendment extending Rule 408's protective
reach to exclude a party's prior inconsistent statements in compromise
negotiations from admission into evidence for impeachment purposes would
strengthen the inducement to settle claims without erecting any new
substantial obstacles in the way of the truth-finding process. The central
rationale is that, if the laws permit compromise negotiations to become arenas
where a party could risk a potential coup de grace to its case, this risk would
weigh against a party's initial decision to engage in compromise and thus
effectively undermine the public policy encouraging settlements. 16
14 See, e.g., MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE TEXT, R, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 457
(1983)(Rule 408 is "[djifficult to apply in practice."); Brazil, supra note 6, at 1029 (noting
that lawyers should proceed with caution when engaging in compromise negotiations);
Michaels, supra note 8, at 34 (noting that Rule 408 "is more dangerous than it looks" and
that "[vieteran negotiators know that Rule 408 is full of perils, pitfalls, and exceptions.");
David K. Rees, Rule 408; Statenents Made in the Course of Settlenent Negotiations, 20 COLO.
LAW. 1520 (1991) (alerting lawyers to the possibility that damaging settlement
statements "will not necessarily be excluded from evidence."); Practical Trial Suggestions:
Compromise and Settlement-Admissibility Issues, 29 DEF. L.J. 253, 262-63 (Aug.
1980)("Admissibility of settlement negotiation evidence [is] an 'iffy' matter.").
15See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 6, at 966 ("This sobering position means that counsel
either must accept only half-rationale negotiations (the 'blind man's bluff' approach...)
or must look to some device other than rule 408 to protect the confidentiality of what
they say during negotiations."); 1 SALTZBURG & MARTIN, supra note 8, at 351 ("A choice
must be made between allowing free bargaining where the parties can let their hair
down ... and requiring parties ... to cast all factual statements either in hypothetical
form or pursuant to an explicit agreement.... A Rule cannot have it both ways.");
SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 8, at 191 ("If impeachment is to be permitted whenever
bargaining breaks down, it is probable that most lawyers will waste their client's time
with hypothetical versions of facts that could be stated directly."); Gladstone, supra note
12, at S240 ("[Ijnclusion of the 'without prejudice' language is often used as an additional
guarantee that the evidence will be inadmissible."); MARK A. DOMBROFF, FEDERAL TRIAL
EVIDENCE 66.1 (1994)(proposing, as a preventative measure, to note on all
compromise-related correspondence "compromise and/or offer to compromise
material not admissible in evidence at trial pursuant to Rule 408."). But see 23 WRIGHT
& GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 292 (suggesting that since the decision to strike 408's second
sentence "was ultimately reversed on grounds that disparaged the common law devices,
there is no longer any basis for giving them any effect under Rule 408.")(footnote
omitted).
16 See, e.g., Charles T. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEX.
L. REV. 447, 458-59 (1938) ("If one contemplating an offer of settlement, or his attorney,
knew that the offer, if refused, could be used against him, he would as a practical matter
weigh this danger in the balance, and it would often turn the scale of decision against
making the offer."); Mason Ladd, Determination of Relevancy, 31 TUL.L. REV. 81,92(1956)
(noting that, without protection from admission, making an offer of compromise would
be a hazardous act and policy, therefore, supports exclusion); Bill Allcom, The
1995]
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A. Compromise: Ambivalence and Ambiguity
The whole concept of compromise is brimming with ambiguities. 17 The
word itself contains both positive and negative aspects, 18 and though praised
for its social virtue in settling conflicts peacefully,19 often the price for such
peace is concession, which means surrendering something to the opponent.20
This appears contrary to simplified principles of honor and righteousness, and
engenders ambivalence.21
Admissibility of a Compromise Settlement in Evidence, 1 BAYLOR L. REV. 160, 169
(1948)(suggesting that "it is little short of trickery to encourage and foster such
settlements on the one hand and then force one to accept his settlement as his undoing
on the other hand.").
17 See, e.g., WEINSTEIN ET AL, supra note 13, at 408-21 ("[A]ny offer of compromise is
essentially ambiguous .. ."); Robert J. Lipkin, Kibitzers, Fuzzies, and Apes Without Tails:
Pragmatism and the Art of Conversation in Legal Theory, 66 TUL. L. REV. 69, 131-32 (1991)
('The term compromise itself is ambiguous .... "); George M. Bell, Admissions Arising
Out of Compromise-Are they Irrelevant?, 31 TEX. L. REV. 239, 244 (1953)("We have in effect
an ambiguous act in any offer of settlement.").
18 See, e.g., Joseph H. Carens, Compromises in Politics, in NOMOS XXI: COMPROMISE IN
ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS 123, 123 a. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1979)("Ordinary attitudes toward compromise are marked by a fundamental ambiguity
which is reflected in the definition of the term itself."); WILLIAM C. BURTON, LEGAL
THESAURUS 93 (2d ed. 1992)(defining the verb "compromise" as either "Settle by mutual
agreement" or "Endanger," and listing other synonyms of the latter, inter alia "expose to
danger, hazard, imperil, . . . make vulnerable, . . . put under suspicion, risk, stake,
venture."); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 232 (Henry B. Woolf ed.,
1973)(defining the intransitive verb "compromise" as either "to come to agreement by
mutual concession" or "to make a shameful or disreputable concession.'). Cf George A.
Kelly, Mediation Versus Compromise in Hegel, in NOMOS XXI: COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW,
AND POLITICS, supra, at 87, 91 ("French has the word compromis, which more or less
expresses the settlement of differences... [1It also has the word compromission, applied
frequently to dramas of the boudoir, which means a fatal sacrifice of one's virtue, or a
'sell out'.....).
19 See, e.g., EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 209 (4th ed.
1963)("Almost all courts agree that there is a strong policy in favor of the settlement of
disputed claims without litigation."); Arthur Kuflik, Morality and Compromise, in NOMOS
XXI: COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS, supra note 18, at 38 (noting that
willingness to compromise is often viewed as a profound "expression of moral
goodwill").
2 0 See, e.g., 8 WORDS AND PHRASES 456 (perm. ed. 1951), citing Texas Creosoting Co.
v. R.B. Tyler Co., 156 So. 814 (La. 1934) ("'Compromises' are distinguishable from
'contracts' in which equivalents are exchanged, since intention of parties in compromise
agreement is to avoid litigation even at expense of what belongs to them."); David
Resnick, Justice, Compromise, and Constitutional Rules in Aristotle's Politics, in NOMOS XXI:
COMPROMISEIN ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS, supra note 18, at 69 (noting that compromise
engenders a feeling that something has been given up and that the terms often can
"appear slightly shabby.").
21As stated by one commentator,
There is at least an air of paradox surrounding the connection between




A compromise presupposes a common language among the opposing
parties, and one party's moral acknowledgment of the other.22 This requires
emotional compromising and an elevated level of dedication.23 Central to
acknowledging the moral legitimacy of the opposition is the problem of trust.24
The conflict may be effectively terminated only if the parties can rely on their
mutual promise23 to adhere to the compromise agreement, and an equitable
agreement 2 6 is most likely to emerge in an atmosphere of openness, 2 7 power
equilibrium 2 8 and confidentiality.29
will is a person of firm principle, we are often inclined to suppose
that the willingness to compromise is a sad but sure sign of moral
turpitude....
Of course, to affirm that compromise is in many cases morally
commendable is not to deny that at times it is reprehensible....
There are circumstances (Chamberlain at Munich?) in which even
the cause of peace is ill-served by accommodation. If this were not
so, it would be hard to explain how the term "compromise" has
acquired a pejorative as well as an honorific sense.
Kuflik, supra note 19, at 38,52. This ambivalence to compromise may have been reflected
in The Sermon on the Mount. See Matthew 5:9 ("Blessed are the peacemakers, for they
shall be called sons of God.")(footnote indicating that "Peacemakers are not merely
'peaceable,' but those who work earnestly to 'make' peace."). But see id. at 6:24 ("No one
can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be
devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon.").
2 2 See Martin P. Golding, The Nature of Compromise: A Preliminary Inquiry, in NOMOS
XXI: COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS, supra note 18, at 16 ("The compromise
process is a conscious process in which there is a degree of moral acknowledgment of the
other party. The other party is accorded some degree of moral legitimacy, and so are some
of his interests.'); see also Theodore M. Benditt, Compromising Interests and Principles, in
NOMOS XXI: COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS, supra note 18, at 26, 27 ("In
compromise a person has a certain sort of respect for his opponent, because of which
he is willing to agree to an accommodation rather than make the best deal for himself
that he can.").
23 See Golding, supra note 22, at 5 ("The compromiser is either weak-willed or
hypocritical or irrational. Compromise, therefore, may be dismissed as lacking moral
significance.').
24 See, e.g., id. at 18 ("A party can be trusted to mean what he says and to mean it
sincerely . . .but perhaps only to the degree that the legitimacy of the other is
recognized."); id. at 19 ("The introduction of trust, and trustworthiness too, helps to
explain the possibility of accommodation, for a convergence of expectation is required
to terminate the conflict.").
25 See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 18, at 232 (tracing the origin
of the word "compromise" to the Latin word compromissum, from neutral of
compromissus, past participle of compromittere; "to promise mutually."); cf. BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 287 (6th ed. 1990) (explaining compromissum as a "submission to
arbitration").
2 6 See, e.g., 8 WORDS AND PHRASES, supra note 20, at 447, citing O'Hare v. Peterson, 33
N.W.2d 566, 568 (Neb. 1948)("A 'compromise' is an arrangement arrived at for settling
a dispute upon what appears to be equitable terms."); Benditt, supra note 22, at 29
("Though compromising conflicts of interests is similar in some respects to bargaining
in that it involves proposal, attempt to secure agreement, and mutual concession, it
1995]
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
To ensure the presence of these elements requires extraordinary efforts from
the conflicting parties. However, since the core of any compromise is mutual
concessions, 30 a compromise settlement will rarely be a rational party's
preferred outcome,31 but rather a default option arrived at following a
cost-benefit analysis of the option of continuing the conflict.32
With the relatively high demands on the compromising parties' dedication
and risk-taking on one hand, and the potential for comparatively modest
differs in that it involves giving due consideration to the interests of the opponent and
attempting to find a fair accommodation.").
27 See, e.g., Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 13, at 38 ("Mediation often reveals
deep-seated feelings on sensitive issues. Compromise negotiations often require the
admission of facts which disputants would never otherwise concede."); Edward
Stettinius, quoted in Golding, supra note 22, at 5 (citing FRED C. IKLE, How NATIONS
NEGOTIATE 206 (1967))("Compromise, when reached honorably and in a spirit of honesty
by all concerned, is the only fair and rational way of reaching a reasonable agreement
between two differing points of view.").
28 The two parties who sit down together at the table to reach a settlement
by compromise have rejected the prospect of reaching one by pure
bargaining.... Though a principle of reciprocity is present, it is never
completely operative, except perhaps in an "ideal" form of the com-
promise situation. Where full reciprocity exists, the parties recognize
each other as moral equals despite their relative bargaining strengths.
Golding, supra note 22, at 17;cf. Friedrich W. Nietzsche, Human, All-Too-Human, reprinted
in BASIC WRITINGS OF NIETZSCHE 148 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1968), quoted in Kuflik,
supra note 19, at 56 ("Justice (fairness) originates among those who are approximately
equally powerful, ... where there is no clearly recognizable predominance and a fight
would mean inconclusive mutual damage, there the idea originates that one might come
to an understanding and negotiate one's claims...").
29See, e.g., Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 13, at 38 ("Fairness to the disputants
requires confidentiality. . . . [P]arties often make communications without the
expectation that they will later be bound by them. Subsequent use of information
generated at these proceedings could therefore be unfairly prejudicial...").
30 See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, supra note 25, citing Newsom v. Miller, 258 P.2d
812,814 (Wash. 1953) (defining compromise and settlement as "Settlement of a disputed
claim by mutual concession to avoid lawsuit."); 8 WORDS AND PHRASES, supra note 20, at
453-55 (annotating numerous cases under heading "Concessions must be mutual.");
Beverly Hess, Compromise in Louisiana, 14 TUL. L. REv. 282, 285-86 & n.29 (1940)
(suggesting that Louisiana's statutory compromise "contemplates reciprocal sacrifices".
But see Bell, supra note 17, at 253 ("[Ihf actual settlement of differences is the end desire,
it should be immaterial whether or not there was a yielding in the negotiations. Our
inquiry should be whether the parties were attempting to settle their differences...").
31 See J.D. Lee, Some Comments on Negotiations and Settlement, 4 AN. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
277, 285-86 (1980) ("As a rule, if a settlement is reached with which both parties are
uneasy, it is probably a good one.").
32 See Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 13 (1992) ("A party decides to sue or settle by comparing the value
of the two alternatives-settlement and continued litigation .... A rational party will not
contest a claim unless her expected net gain from continued litigation is greater than




results on the other, one could easily be tempted to infer that the idea and
practice of compromise would be rather marginal in an adversarial justice
system. But that would not be entirely correct.33
Plato presented the concept of justice itself as being a compromise.34
Commentators have also suggested that laws are, in effect, compromises,35
and that, as social animals, we organize society through negotiation and
compromise. 36 In the common-law tradition, compromise has been an integral
part of jurisprudence and conflict resolution since the Norman Conquest,37 and
at least for the last hundred years, it has been the express public policy to
encourage compromise and settlement of disputes.38
3 3 See Martin Shapiro, Compromise and Litigation, in NOMOS XXI: COMPROMISE IN
ETHICS, LAW,AND POLITICS, supra note 18, at 163,174 ("[C]ompromise is as central a mode
of Western legal systems as is winner-take-all litigation."); id. at 172 ("[F]rom the
perspective of the legal system they [negotiation and litigation] constitute mutually
supporting processes each of which is necessary to the success of the other.").
34 This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice; -it is a mean or
compromise between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not
be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without
the power of retaliation; and justice, being at the middle point between
the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honored by
reason of the inability of men to do injustice.
PLATO, 2 THE REPUBLIC 622-23 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1937), quoted in Kuflik, supra note
19, at 55-56.
35 See Aleksander Peczenik, Cumulation and Compromises of Reasons in the Law, in
NoMos XXI: COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAw, AND POLITICS, supra note 18, at 176,176 ("Legal
norms are, generally speaking, a result of various compromises. The law aims at
achieving an equivalence of conflicting interests. The law is itself a result of a
compromise of various political and other interests, both in legislation and in
adjucation.").
3 6 See Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation With America (Mar. 22, 1775), quoted in
Golding, supra note 22 at 3, 7 (suggesting that all government and every human virtue
is founded on compromise); see generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering
Through Negotiation; Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REv. 637 (1976)
(exploring how personal norms influence private negotiations for resolving disputes
and establishing rules for future conduct); H.L.A. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority,
40 U. CHI. L. REv. 534,535 (1973) (discussing how principles of justice and standards of
conduct arrived at by parties in "the original position" apply when liberties are in
conflict).
3 7See Shapiro, supra note 33, at 166, citing DORIS STENTON, ENGLISH JUSTICE, 1066-1215
(1964) ("[Tjhe judicial ideal of Anglo-Saxon justice was not litigation but mutual
agreement confirmed and recorded in judicial proceedings."); see also Kelly, supra note
18, at 89 ("English politics . . . proceeded by a series of compromises. The U.S.
Constitution of 1787 was a vast and genial compromise between the states and the
central power, the states themselves, and existing economic interests.).
38 The public policy may have been promoted by Lord Mansfield, who based the rule
of excluding offers of compromise on the rationale that "it must be permitted to men 'to
buy their peace' without prejudice to them, if the offer did not succeed; and such offers
are made to stop litigation without regard to the question whether any thing or what is
due." BULLER'S NIsI PRIUS 236b (7th ed. 1817), quoted in David Vaver, "Without Prejudice"
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B. Public Policy: "The Highest Law"
Public policy is a vast,3 9 nebulous40 and fluctuating 41 concept that
incorporates the overarching general ideas of public good,42 public welfare,43
community conscience 44 and the individual's duties to society45 that are ex-
Communications; Their Admissibility and Effect, 9 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 85,88 (1974). A
similar formulation was used by Justice Dewey in Dickinson v. Dickinson, 50 Mass. (9
Met.) 471, 474 (1845): "It must be permitted to men to endeavor to buy their peace,
without being prejudiced by a rejection of their offers." Quoted in JOHN H. WIGMORE, 4
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1061 at 34 (James H. Chadbourn rev., 1972); see
also Grady v. deVille Motor Hotel, Inc., 415 F.2d 449, 451 (10th Cir. 1969), quoted in John
R. Schmertz, Jr, Relevancy and Its Policy Counterweights; A Brief Excursion Through Article
IV of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 1, 17 n.94 (1974)(advocating that
thelaw "should not discourage settlement by subjecting a person who has compromised
a claim to the hazard of having the settlement proved in subsequent trial..."); Connor
v. Michigan Wis. Pipe Line Co., 113 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Wis. 1962) ("We have yet to find
a court decision holding that it is not in the interest of public policy that compromise
settlementofdisputedclaims be encouraged."); MORGAN, supra note 19. Fora contrasting
argument, see Owen M. Fiss,Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984)(suggesting that
settlements may sacrifice justice to obtain peace, and should not be encouraged).
3 9 See 35 WORDS AND PHRASES 456 (perm. ed. 1963), quoting United States v.
Musgrave, 160 F. 700,702 (E.D. Ark. 1908) ("The 'public policy' of the government is not
limited to such matters as are universally considered as injurious to the public interests,
but any acts reasonably tending to have that effect may be prohibited by statute, and
thereupon they are against public policy.").
40
"Public policy" is in its nature so uncertain and fluctuating, varying with
the habits and fashions of the day.., that it is difficult to determine its
limits with any degree of exactness. It has never been defined by the
courts, but has been let loose and free from definition in the same manner as fraud.
Id., quoting Pendleton v. Greever, 193 P. 885, 887 (Okla. 1920).
41 See, e.g., id. at 455, quoting Barwin v. Reidy, 307 P.2d 175,181 (N.M. 1957) ("'Public
policy' imports something that is uncertain and fluctuating, varying with the changing
economic needs, social customs, and moral aspirations of the people."); id. at 456,
quoting Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Moll, 58 N.E.2d 947, 950-51 (Ind. App. 1945) ("'Public
policy' is a term that is not always easy to define and it may vary as the habits, opinions,
and welfare of a people may vary ....').
42 See 35 WORDS AND PHRASES 159 (perm. ed. Supp. 1994), quoting Finkler v. Toledo
Ski Club, 577 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) ("'Public policy' is that which is
naturally and inherently just and right.").
43 See id. at 160, quoting Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 746 (Tenn. 1987) ("'Public
policy' is present concept of public welfare or general good."); cf. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1233 (expanding the definition of"public welfare" to "bring
within its purview regulations for the promotion of economic welfare and public
convenience.").
44See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1231, quoting Hammonds v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 796 (E.D. Ohio 1965) (public policy is community





pressed through our laws and court decisions.46 As such, it has been
proclaimed the "highest law"47 that overrides the concerns for the individual,48
but it has also been criticized for its volatility49 and its vulnerability to political
influence. 50
C. Common Law: Conflicting Rationales
Until Rule 408 was enacted, thereby establishing "promotion of the public
policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes" as the "more
consistently impressive ground 51 for excluding compromise evidence from
trial, sundry rationales for the exclusionary rule were used by the courts,52
resulting in inconsistent applications and results. 53
46 See, e.g., 35 WORDS AND PHRASES, supra note 39, at 457, quoting Billingsley v.
Clelland, 23 S.E. 812, 815 (W. Va. 1895) ("The term 'public policy' is equivalent to the
'policy of the law.' It is applicable to the spirit as well as the letter."); 35 WORDS AND
PHRASES (Supp. 1994), supra note 42, at 159, quoting White v. Barcardi, 446 So.2d 150,
156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("'Public policy,' although often used loosely, means the
law of the state, whether found in or clearly implied from its constitution, statutes, or
judicial decisions.").
47See HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 1 (10th ed. 1939) ("Salus Populi
est suprena Lex. (XII. Tables:-Bacon, Max., reg. 12.)-Regard for the public welfare is the
highest law.").
4 8See BURTON, supra note 18, at 422 ("Necessitas publica major est quam privata. Public
necessity is greater than private. Jura publica anteferenda privatis. Public rights are to be
preferred to private parts. Privatum comniodum publico cedit. Private good yields to public
good.').
49 See BROOM, supra note 47, at 507.
50 See Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 27 ("Many public policies are better
explained as the outcome of a pure power struggle--clothed in a rhetoric of public
interest that is a mere figleaf-among narrow interest or pressure groups.").
51FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note, supra note 9, at 195.
52There are at least five principal reasons which have been advanced
by the courts as to why offers in compromise are excluded from
evidence: (1) such offers are irrelevant since they do not imply belief
in the validity of the adversary's position, (2) parties to a compromise
negotiation may by express or implied contract agree that admissions
made therein shall be excluded from evidence and courts will enforce
the secrecy agreement, (3) offers of compromise are excluded because
the offeror does not intend to make an admission, (4) it is only fair play
to exclude the unsuccessful efforts at compromise so as to prevent them
from being turned upon one of the parties, (5) offers of compromise are
privileged communications since the law favors the settlement of differ-
ences without resort to litigation.
Bell, supra note 17, at 240-41 (footnotes omitted).
53 There has been substantial dispute as to the rationale for the rule that
an offer of compromise may not be used as an admission of the validity
or invalidity of the claim. This disagreement has had an effect on the
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Although commentators disagree over which theory is the oldest,54 it
appears that the approach predating any contemporary rationale was one of
hostility against out-of-court settlements,55 possibly stemming from English
courts' competition over jurisdiction and potential litigants in the early
seventeenth century.56 Aline of cases starting in 1716,57 however, treated offers
to compromise as non-binding offers made without consideration, and
therefore of no evidentiary weight.58 This contract rationale gained support in
common law courts through the 1700s,5 9 but was then overshadowed by a new
justification championed by Lord Kenyon in a string of cases just before the
admissibility of "statements of independent fact" made during the course
of negotiations for compromise.
2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 408-19 (footnote omitted); see also Judson F. Falknor,
Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 574,593 (1955) ("The correct
characterization of the rule is important because upon its characterization (as a rule of
competency or as a rule of privilege) will depend significant procedural results.")
(footnote omitted); Waltz & Huston,supra note 8, at 11 ("The rationale relied upon by a
court in excluding evidence of the actual compromise offer usually dictated its approach
to independent statements of fact accompanying the offer.").
54 See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, at § 5302, at 169 ('"he oldest justification,
what Wigmore called the 'true reasons', for the rule was that such evidence was
irrelevant.") (footnotes omitted). But see Vaver, supra note 38, at 86 (suggesting that
relevancy as a test of admissibility is a relatively recent concept in evidence law).
5 5See Vaver, supra note 38, at 86 ("As the courts' initial hostility towards arbitration
as a form of settling disputes indicates, the policy then may have been one of
discouraging extrajudicial settlement and encouraging litigation."). "[W]here a
submission to arbitration under seal was held recoverable at any time before the award
had been made .... Id. at n.5 (citing Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (1609)).
561d. ( Perhaps this occurred during the period when the various courts were vying
with one another for jurisdiction and when judges were being paid according to the
number of cases they heard.").
571d. at 87 & nn.8, 11 ("[Tjhat case appeared to turn on the point that a bare promise
made without consideration was not binding as being a mere nudum pactum.") (citing
Harman v. Vanhatton, 23 Eng. Rep. 1071 (1716)); Turton v. Benson, 24 Eng. Rep. 488
(1718) ("Mr. Turton's offers made and accepted signified nothing; that Lord Cowper had
often said a man should not be bound by an offer made during a treaty which afterwards
broke off, or upon terms that were not accepted.") (quoting Jekyll, M.R.); Baker v. Paine,
27 Eng. Rep. 1140 (1750) ("[G]enerally speaking, offers by the parties by way of
compromise are not to have much weight in the merits of the case, nor to be made use
of.. .") (quoting Lord Hardwicke L.C.). Another commentator considered Turton and
Slack v. Buchanan, 170 Eng. Rep. 59 (1790), as cases turning on the relevancy rationale.
John E. Tracy, Evidence-Admissibility of Statenents of Fact Made During Negotiation for
Compromise, 34 MICH. L. REV. 524, 527 & n.11 (1936).
58 Vaver, supra note 38, at 86 (suggesting that the original reason for the rule was that
a settlement offer "was made without consideration, thus not binding, thus of no
weight.").




turn of the nineteenth century: men should be allowed "to buy their peace,"60
and evidence of their peace-purchasing negotiations should be excluded, in
order to encourage that method of conflict resolution.61 It appears that this was
the harbinger of today's public policy rationale.
Following Lord Mansfield's coining of the phrase "without prejudice, "62
English courts gradually turned toward that phrase as a required prefatory
qualification for keeping statements from compromise negotiations
inadmissible in court.63 By the turn of the twentieth century, the practice had
embedded itself in British jurisprudence. 64 However, its dual origin in both
6OVaver, supra note 38, at 88 n.15 (listing cases: Slack v. Buchanan, 170 Eng. Rep. 59
(1790); Waldridge v. Kennison, 170 Eng. Rep. 306 (1794); Turner v. Railton, 170 Eng.
Rep. 424 (1796); Gregory v. Howard, 170 Eng. Rep. 557 (1800)). See also BULLER'S NISI
PRIUS, supra note 38.
61See Vaver, supra note 38, at 88 ("The theory that the rule was contract-based fell into
disfavour. The courts preferred the reason that extrajudicial settlement of disputes
ought to be encouraged by preventing admission into evidence of negotiations entered
into for the purpose of 'buying peace.").
62 See Vaver, supra note 38. Another thought by Lord Mansfield was later adopted by
Dean Greenleaf, an early advocate for the relevancy rationale. See Bell, supra note 17, at
244 n.18 ("[A] defendant being sued for [E100] and offering [20] to be rid of the action
neither admitted nor ascertained any debt.")(citing 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 321
(16th ed. 1899)). Dean Wigmore was retained to edit the following edition of Greenleaf's
treatise, but in the process he created a whole new treatise which was "greeted with
adulation" when it appeared in 1904. Jacob A. Stein, The Quest for Colonel Wigniore, 19
LIrICATION 43, 44 (1992).
63 A few cases through 1846 "held offers of compromise to be inadmissible even
where not qualified by such words as 'without prejudice."' Vaver, supra note.38, at 90
& n.23 (listing cases: Wayman v. Hilliard, 131 Eng. Rep. 39 (1830); Tennant v. Hamilton,
7 [sic] Eng. Rep. 1012 (1839); Jardine v. Sheridan, 175 Eng. Rep. 10 (1846)). However,
"[in two [earlier] rulings of Lord Tenterden, offers by defendants, after the action had
been brought, of specific sums less than the amount claimed by the plaintiff were held
admissible as admissions of liability, the plaintiff obtaining a verdict in both cases,"
defendants having failed to qualify by "without prejudice." Id. at 89 & n.19 (listing cases:
Nicholson v. Smith, 171 Eng. Rep. 797 (1822); Wallace v. Small, 173 Eng. Rep. 1219
(1830)). "[T]he decision in Wallace v. Small itself marks the turning point of the 'without
prejudice' rule. From 1830, the cases rarely involve implied 'without prejudice', but
rather became increasingly concerned with defining the scope of negotiations expressed
to be 'without prejudice'." Id. at 90 & n.24 (also noting that CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK
HoUSE, "[plublished in monthly parts during 1852-53," satirized these developments
through law clerk Guppy's "without prejudice" marriage proposal to Ms. Summerson).
See also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 1061, at 36 n.3 (citing 2 L. & LAW. 305
(1840)(containing an "amusing anecdote" strikingly similar to Dickens' story)).
64Vaver, supra note 38, at 92 ("By the end of the nineteenth century, the doctrine of
stare decisis had almost irretrievably fixed the approach to the scope of the express
'without prejudice' rule as involving an exercise in semantics under the guise of a search
for the parties' intention.").
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contract and public policy rationales has caused confusion in Commonwealth
courts over the true meaning of the words "without prejudice."65
American courts, meanwhile, have utilized a variety of rationales and
combinations thereof to explain the inadmissibility of compromise evidence to
prove the validity or amount of a claim.66 Commentators generally agree that
Dean Wigmore's relevancy rationale67 was predominant until the enactment
65 1d. ("Does not 'without prejudice' mean, 'I make you an offer; if you do not accept
it, this letter is not to be used against me?") (quoting In Re River Steamer Co.; Mitchell's
Claim, 6 Ch. App. 822,826 (1871) Games L.J.)). But see id. ("[Tihe writer is not entitled to
make this reservation in respect of a document which, from its character, may prejudice
the person to whom it is addressed if he should reject the offer.. .")(quoting In Re
Daintrey, ex parte Holt, 2 Q.B. 116, 120 (1893) (Williams J.)). See also id. at 85 ("[L]etters
get headed 'without prejudice' in the most absurd circumstances.") (quoting Tomlin v.
Standard Telephones & Cables Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 1378,1384 (C.A. 1969) (Ormrod J.)). For a
recent American example of confusion over the use of "without prejudice," see Coakley
& Williams v. Structural Concrete Equip., 973 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1992)(plaintiff's
settlement offer containing the prefatory words "without prejudice" was nevertheless
admitted, without any apparent recognition of, or reference to, their common-law
significance).
66 See Bell, supra note 17, at 240-41.
67The true reason for excluding an offer of compromise is that it does
not ordinarily proceed from and imply a specific belief that the
adversary's claim is well founded, but rather a belief that the further
prosecution of that claim, whether well founded or not, would in any
event cause such annoyance as is preferably avoided by the payment
of the sum offered. In short, the offer implies merely a desire for peace,
not a concession of wrong done.
4 WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 1061, at 36. But see McCormick, supra note 16, at 458:
[T]he argument fails. The reason offered is not coextensive with the rule.
The reason is applicable only to such offers as might ordinarily be made
to one asserting an unfounded claim or defense. If the defendant offers
to pay nine-tenths of the asserted claim, it is unlikely in the highest degree
that he believes the claim unfounded, but the rule applies to that offer
just as it does to the proposal to pay one-tenth.
See also Bell, supra note 17, at 242-43:
It is true that a desire to obtain peace may be a motivating factor behind
offers of settlement, but such a motive can and often does exist together
with other factors which indicate a belief in the validity of the claim
asserted. Finding the elusive "buying of peace" does not, without
further investigation, warrant a conclusion that the offer is irrelevant.
Bell suggests that Dean Wigmore used his own experience "as the foundation for his
analysis." Id. at 244 & n.14:
Wigmore's error is really an error of observation. Has he made an
accurate analysis of the complex considerations which induce people
to make offers of settlement? If his factual assumption is inaccurate,
then his conclusions are likewise erroneous. Furthermore, he compounds
his error because he states his basic assumption in terms of what people
ordinarily do while his conclusions therefrom is a universal.
Cf Stein, supra note 62, at 45 (suggesting a lesser-known side of Dean Wigmore; he
"disparaged the importance of the technical rule" of evidence, and was "impatient with
any exclusionary rules that might interfere with the scientific search for truth. For him,




of Rule 408,68 though some courts and commentators nevertheless continued
to espouse alternative theories for exclusion, most notably contract and
privilege.69
II. TODAY'S RATIONALE
Since the adoption of Rule 408, privilege has emerged at the center of
controversy in the search for a coherent rationale for the rule.70 The Advisory
Committee explicitly rejected the common-law "without prejudice" theory and
knowledge, to an understanding of how facts are proven and decision-makers
persuaded.").
68 See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 19, at 209 ("Most of the American opinions indicate
that the offer has no relevance if in fact it is an offer to buy peace."); Waltz & Huston,
supra note 8, at 11 ("Prior to Rule 408's advent, all federal and most state courts excluded
offers of compromise as irrelevant to the substantive issues .... ).
69 See, e.g., M.C. Slough, Relevancy Unraveled (Part III), 5 U. KAN. L. REV. 675,719 (1957)
(suggesting that "a recognizable trend of judicial opinion" and an "increasing tide of text
authorities" were leaning toward the privilege rationale); McCormick, supra note 16, at
459 & n.35 (noting that the privilege rationale view is "fortified by a substantial number
of judicial pronouncements.")(footnote listing cases); Bell, supra note 17, at 253 ("In the
confusion resulting from the coexistence of our several theories, it is difficult to state the
view followed by the greatest number of American courts. Perhaps the privilege theory
has the most adherents.")(footnotes omitted); Tracy, supra note 57, at 528 ("Among the
text writers, Jones takes the view that public policy in encouraging compromise is the
basis for the present rule; while Chamberlayne scouts the idea of privilege and argues
for the admission of all compromise statements.") (footnotes omitted); id. at 525 n.4 ("No
definite alignment of the courts can be made because the privilege and relevancy
theories are not mutually exclusive. A court may consider an offer both privileged and
irrelevant.")(listing cases); see also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 1061, at 36 ("ITlhis
tradition ['without prejudice'] has helped to cloud the discussion and to confuse the
long line of rulings.')(footnote omitted); 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5302, at
168-69 ("[If the courts were in agreement on the nature of the rule, there was no such
consensus on its justification. The rationale for the rule has varied from time to time and
to place to place .... Although a few American cases adopted the contract theory, most
courts followed Wigmore in rejecting it.")(footnotes omitted); id. at 169 n.15 ("New Jersey
apparently followed the English rule down to the time when the Uniform Rules were
adopted in that state."); cf. Waltz & Huston, supra note 8, at 12 (noting that the contract
theory was rejected by the Third Circuit in Outlook Hotel Co. v. St. John, 287 F. 115 (3d
Cir. 1923)).
70 See 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 408-23 ("Treating the rule as a privilege
seems sensible, although Rule 408 reads as if it were a rule of absolute exclusion....");
Blakely, supra note 8, at 224 ("This policy of privilege also underlies federal rule
408.")(footnote omitted); Gladstone, supra note 12, at S240 (claiming that the final and
most recent justification for the exclusionary rule is privilege). But see Brazil, supra note
6, at 988 ("The majority view seems to be that settlement communications are not
'privileged'..."); Kerwin, supra note 11, at 670 (noticing that case law "clearly indicates"
that there is no privilege for settlement communications established by Rule 408).
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the relevancy-based 71 practice of hypothetical phrasing,72 and proclaimed
"promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of
disputes"73 as the "more impressive ground" for the rule.74
This is in accord with commentators who have found public policy at the
heart of most of the settlement-exclusionary rationales that predate Rule 408,75
and with courts' practice of blending the policy concept in with other
rationales, even with the highly technique-oriented relevancy theory.76
However, since the privilege theory was left unaddressed, 77 some
commentators have attempted to find a tacit creation of a compromise privilege
71 See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 38, at § 1061, at 34 ("[A] concession which is hypothetical
or conditional only can never be interpreted as an assertion representing the party's actual
belief, and therefore cannot be an admission; and, conversely, an unconditional
assertion is receivable, without any regard to the circumstances which accompany it.").
72 See advisory committee's note, supra note 9 (although mentioning the relevancy
theory as one of the grounds for exclusion, stressing that "The validity of this position
will vary..." and criticizing the practice of hypotheticals); cf James Wm. Moore & Helen
I. Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9, 18 (1974)(finding that the
Advisory Committee "somewhat more dubiously" justified Rule 408 on relevancy); see
also 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5302, at 173 ("Because the Advisory Committee
had earlier abandoned Wigmore's concept of 'legal relevance' in favor of a broad
definition of relevance coupled with a discretionary power to exclude, it would have
been very difficult to explain Rule 408 as an application of the doctrine of relevance.");
Gladstone, supra note 12, at S239 (suggesting that Wigmore's relevance theory has been
"impliedly rejected by rule 408.").
73 See advisory committee's note, supra note 9.
741d.
75 See Vaver, supra note 56 (the hostility to settlement in the 1600s could arguably be
viewed as an expression of the public policy at the time, albeit contra to the current public
policy); Vaver supra note 61 (public policy in the "without prejudice" tradition); Bell,
supra note 17, at 247 ("[Tjhe English courts are in the peculiar position of favoring
compromises as a matter of public policy but limiting the application of the policy to
situations where the parties have contracted their admissions out of evidence."); id. at
248 (' The magic phrase ['without prejudice'] is merely a signal to the adversary and the
court, though not a conclusive one, that the negotiations are subject to the policy."); see
also Norman B. Peek, Evidence, 21 S. CAL. L. REv. 414, 415 (1948)(suggesting that "the
original reasons for excluding offers of compromise" were both public policy and lack
of relevancy); Tracy, supra note 57, at 527 (proposing, by way of conjecture, that the first
court to exclude evidence of compromise offers based on lack of relevancy "may have
considered them privileged" but chose the more narrow relevancy test instead, thus
establishing precedence); id., supra note 69, at 525 n.4 (reporting courts' mixing of
privilege and relevancy theories); cf. Thomas Black, Evidence, 16 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 331,
340 (1985)(suggesting that Rule 408 "echoes the common law policy" of exclusion based
on the effort to encourage settlements).
76 See Tracy, supra note 57; Slough, supra note 69, at 718 n.509 (listing cases where
"relevancy and policy interlarded").




in the Advisory Committee's public policy language.78 Courts, however, have
been generally unwilling to follow this construction. 79
A. Extrinsic Exclusionary Public Policy
The controversy may, in part, have its origin in a disparate understanding
of the character and function of extrinsic policies, and in the continuing
controversy over privileges.80 Exclusionary policies affect otherwise relevant
evidence at trial and are addressed in Article IV of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.81 The most common policy consideration is the danger of unfair
78 See, e.g., 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM (Supp. 1995), supra note 3, § 5315, at 91,92 & n.47.1
("Some courts have by local rule attempted to extend Rule 408 to docket-clearing
procedures designed to get rid of unwanted cases and to expand Rule 408 into a privilege
for all communications during such procedures."); Brazil, supra note 6, at 988 (citing U.S.
District Court for Northern District of California, Amended General Order 16, 1988,
Rule 8, and characterizing it as "purporting to convert Rule 408 from a rule of exclusion
at trial into a privilege . . . '); Waltz & Huston, supra note 8, at 14 (mentioning "the
privilege theory underlying" Rule 408); Gladstone, supra note 12, at S248 ("Viewing the
right to withhold settlement information as a rule of privilege helps to lessen the judge's
role of prejudicial balancing."); see also Green, supra note 8, at 17 ("[Tjhe Rule creates a
quasi-privilege for specificallydefined conduct.");Making Sense, supra note 13, at 1345-46
(categorizing Rule 408 as an "activity privilege rule," noting that its "rationale parallels
exactly the theory underlying the relational privilege rules.")(footnote omitted).
79 See Brazil, supra note 6, at 988 ("The case law support for the view that rule 408, or
its common law antecedent, creates a privilege is relatively thin and appears to represent
the minority view."); Kerwin, supra note 11, at 670 (advocating similar view "despite an
abundance of eloquent policy arguments to the contrary, federal case law clearly
indicates that Rule 408 does not establish a privilege for settlement communications
... 1).
80 See Making Sense, supra note 13, at 1344 & n.30 (noting the "extremely controversial"
draft for Article V, Privileges, of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and quoting Rep.
Hungate, claiming that 50 percent of the complaints to the Criminal Justice
Subcommittee related to that Article). "Privilege" is used for two different concepts: In
connection with "privileged communication," an absolute immunity in a confidential
relationship, such as attorney-client or marital privilege; however, "privilege" is also
used loosely in connection with certain special exemptions or benefits. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1198 ("Privileged communications. Those statements made
by certain persons within a protected relationship such as husband-wife.., and the like
which the law protects from forced disclosure...'); id. at 1197 ("Privilege. A particular
and peculiar benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person, company, or class, beyond the
common advantage of other citizens .... A peculiar right, advantage, exemption,
power, franchise, or immunity held by a person or class, not generally possessed by
others."); BURTON, supra note 18, at 409 (listing two lines of meanings: beneficiun and
immunitas).
81 See FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee's note (as printed at 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972)),
reprinted in JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE app. at B-17 (7th
ed. 1992) ("The exclusion of relevant evidence occurs in a variety of situations and may
be called for by these rules .... Succeeding rules in the present article, in response to
the demands of particular policies, require the exclusion of evidence despite its
relevancy.").
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prejudice.82 While "[aill evidence against the adversary party is prejudicial in
the sense that it creates a resistance to the success of establishing the party's
case,"83 the danger of unfair prejudice will only be weighed by the court when
the probative value of the evidence is comparatively low.84 Thus the policy
consideration is balanced against the evidence's probative value, and in the
court's discretion it may be excluded.
The remaining rules in Article W are specific applications of this theme,
taking into consideration various extrinsic policies.85 Rule 408 represents a
situation where, for a certain class of evidence, and for limited purposes,86 the
conflict between probative value and exclusionary policies has "been resolved
with finality."87 Thus, the public policy interest encouraging compromise has
been found to outweigh the evidential value of otherwise relevant, material
and competent evidence.88
B. Privilege Theory: A Minority View
However, since the Advisory Committee cited Dean McCormick as its
authority for making public policy the true 408 rationale89 without
distinguishing his policy-based privilege theory,90 it has led some to see that
8 2See id., Rule 403, B-18 ("Exclusion for risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues,
misleading the jury, or waste of time, all find ample support in the authorities. 'Unfair
prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.").
83 Ladd, supra note 16, at 89.
84 See id. ('The prejudicial aspects become important only when evidence has a
minimum of probative quality.").
85 See advisory committee's note, supra note 81, at B-18 ('The rules which follow in
this Article are concrete applications evolved for particular situations. However, they
reflect the policies underlying the present rule, which is designed as a guide for the
handling of situations for which no specific rules have been formulated.").
86 See Rule 408, supra note 1 (Evidence of compromise or offer to compromise is "not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount.").
87 Ladd, supra note 16, at 90.
88 See id. at 91-92; see also generally Falknor, supra note 53.
89 See FED. R. EVID. Rule 408, advisory committee's note, supra note 9.
90 See McCormick, supra note 16, at 447-48 ("[The privileges'] sole warrant is the
protection of interests and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of
sufficient social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed
in the administration of justice.") (footnote omitted). However, shorthand definitions
expanded privilege's reach:
Building upon this premise that an exclusionary rule is one
which safeguards against unreliable evidence and may be invoked
as of right only by a party to the suit, and that a rule of privilege is
one which may not be invoked by a party as such, but only by one




citation as a tacit approval of his theory.91 But this inference ignores the
Advisory Committee's rationale underlying Article IV in toto,92 and "does not
fit the rule of law as it is generally accepted and applied."93
Historic privileges of confidential communication, such as the
attorney-client privilege and the marital privilege, are misunderstood if viewed
on a strictly utilitarian basis. 94 Such relationships have in fact been granted
protection to further significant human, social and moral values: "Primarily
they are a right to be let alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly
prescribed relationships, from the state's coercive or supervisory powers and
from the nuisance of its eavesdropping."95 The resulting exclusion of otherwise
relevant evidence at trial "is merely a secondary and incidental feature of the
privileges' vitality."96 It is the all-encompassing divulging of one's entire
persona to one's priest, counsel or spouse that necessitates the privilege,97 and
that characteristic distinguishes it from other confidential communications,
we may be led to classify some rules as rules of privilege which have
not always been recognized as such.
Id. at 450. By way of this simplistic analysis, the rule excluding compromise evidence
was found to be one "which lies close to the border between privilege and
incompetency." Id. at 457.
91See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5315, at 289 ("In adopting the privilege
rationale for Rule 408, the Advisory Committee relied upon McCormick's analysis; it
therefore seems reasonable that they accepted its implications .... .')(footnote omitted).
But see CHARLES T. McCORM!cK, EVIDENCE § 72.1, at 172-73 (3d ed. 1984)(drawing a
stronger distinction between "true rules of privileges" and exclusionary rules, including
"those excluding offers of compromise'-since "the policies toward which these latter
rules are directed may be fully realized by implementing the rules only in litigation"
and "such rules may be asserted only by a party," classifying them as rules of privilege
would be "analytically imprecise.").
92 See FED. R. EVID. Rule 403 advisory committee's note, supra note 85.
934 WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 1061, at 35; cf. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM (Supp. 1995),
supra note 3, § 5315, at 91 ('Though it rests on a privilege-like rationale, the compromise
rule is not a 'privilege' within the meaning of statutes and rules ... ").
94 See Making Sense, supra note 13, at 1343 ("Wigmore's classic definition of privilege
focuses on the most central concept: the relationship at stake must be sufficiently
important that society is willing to sacrifice the production of probative evidence to
preserve confidentiality within the relationship.")(footnotes omitted); see also supra note
90.
9 5 David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion; Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 110-11 (1956).
961d. at 101.
9 7See Francis Bacon, Of Counsell, 20 BACON'S ESSAYS (Macmillan 1892), quoted in
Louisell, supra note 95, at 112-13:
The great Truste, betweene Man and Man, is the Truste of Giving
Counsell. For in other Confidences, Men commit the parts of life; Their
lands, their Goods, their Children, their Credit, some particular affaire;
But to such, as they make their Counsellors, they commit the whole: By
how much the more, they are obliged to all Faith and integrity.
19951
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
such as with one's accountant,98 that involves only an insular part of one's life.
Courts have therefore been reluctant to find new privileges.99
At the root of the rationale for a settlement privilege is the importance of
creating "an environment in which counsel and parties can be fairly confident
that what they say as they negotiate, and the terms of any agreement they might
reach, will not be used against them later."100 However, this would fail Dean
Morgan's privilege test, since "[t]he privilege is that the confidential matter be
not revealed, not that it be not used against the holder of the privilege or any
other .. "101 Finally, several other weighty arguments against the privilege
view have been presented, involving the lack of a special relationship that
society wants to foster; that the rule applies only at the trial stage; that Rule
408's protection is more limited, and only comes into play when a party
attempts to introduce evidence; that Rule 501 shows that Congress did not want
the Federal Rules of Evidence to be the source of privilege law; and that, by
placing it in Article IV, "Relevancy and Its Limits," the Advisory Committee
and the Supreme Court did not intend Rule 408 to establish a new privilege. 102
Based on the preceding inquiry, it seems the better approach to consider Rule
408 as an exclusionary rule at trial, based on the extrinsic public policy of
encouraging compromise and settlement. Rather than attempting to make the
rule something it apparently is not (a rule of compromise negotiation
communication privilege), it would be more constructive to explore how Rule
408 can best serve the public policy of encouraging compromise, 103 while at
the same time exerting minimal negative impact on conflicting public policies
and interests 104 such as the judicial truth-finding process and its need for
relevant evidence.
9 8See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805,817 (1984)(finding the effort
of the Second Circuit to foster candid communication between accountant and client by
creating a self-styled work-product privilege "misplaced").
9 9 See Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 13, at 39 ("A rule of privilege such as that which
we are discussing here shuts out probative evidence, and thus obstructs the truth in
order to protect some other interest or policy. Courts are therefore very reluctant to find
such privileges.").
100See Brazil, supra note 6, at 990.
101EDMuND M. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 102 (1956), quoted in Louisell, supra
note 95, at 111.
102 See Brazil, supra note 6, at 990-91.
103 See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 178 ("[It is unclear how far courts must
go in carrying out the policy of Rule 408.").
104 See Practical Trial Suggestions, supra note 14, at 263 ('There are, as well, numerous
instances in which the evidence is offered... solely to enable the jurors to comprehend
the relationship between the parties and to evaluate testimony. When that occurs, two
important public policy considerations conflict."); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION
OF LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 61 ("The few decisions note but do not purport to resolve




III. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 408
Although the rule has been characterized as "complicated,"105 "full of
loopholes,"106 and "seemingly unstructured," 107 Rule 408's drafting
shortcomings108 are only part of the reason why it is "[d]ifficult to apply in
practice."'109 A more fundamental problem appears to be that "the language of
the rule cuts one way, [and] policy another,"110 presenting courts and litigants
"with the dilemma of choosing between a strict interpretation of the text of the
rule, with its many exceptions, and its underlying policy of promoting
compromise," 111 so that its resultant contribution may "best [be] described as
one of confused reform."112
However, the central source of Rule 408's ambiguity is the second sentence,
excluding "[e]vidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations."113 This represents the most drastic departure from common
law, 114 and lies at the heart of the topic of this Note.
A. First Sentence: Not Admissible to Prove Liability
The first sentence in Rule 408 defines the scope of exclusion:115 Evidence of
offers, or acceptances of offers, of a valuable consideration 116 in efforts to
compromise a disputed"17 claim, is not admissible if presented for the purpose
105Waltz & Huston, supra note 8, at 11.
106Gladstone, supra note 12, at S238.
107Waltz & Huston, supra note 8, at 13.
108 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
109Graham, supra note 14, at 457.
11023 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5314, at 286.
111Kerwin, supra note 11, at 669.
11223 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5302, at 176.
113 See Rule 408, supra note 1.
114 See advisory committee's note, supra note 9:
The practical value of the common law rule has been greatly
diminished by its inapplicability to admissions of fact.... An
inevitable effect is to inhibit freedom of communication ....
Another effect is the generation of controversy over whether a
given statement falls within or without the protected area. These
considerations account for the expansion of the rule herewith to
include evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations, as well as the offer or completed compromise itself.
115 See Rule 408, supra note 1.
116Seegenerally 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5305, at 198 (discussing "valuable
consideration"); 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 408-14, 15.
117 See generally 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 7, § 171, at 459-63 (discussing "the
controversy requirement").
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of proving liability for the claim, its invalidity, or its amount. This delineation
of only three forbidden purposes is the most "consequential limit"118 on the
rule's scope.
A strict interpretation of the rule would consider that "its protection applies
only when the evidence is offered for the purpose of establishing liability for
or invalidity of a claim,"119 and that "408 permits settlement evidence for any
purpose except to prove or disprove liability or the amount of the claim."1 20
However, such an approach loses sight of the fact that "Rule 408 is a rule of
exclusion, not admissibility,"121 and that "the policies that inspire rule 408 are
so important that courts should interpret the scope of its protection liberally."122
B. Second Sentence: Statements Likewise Not Admissible
Most significantly, the "strict interpretation" approach ignores the crucial
consequence of the second sentence, making statement evidence "likewise not
admissible."1 23 It has been assumed that the word "likewise" assigned the same
limited protection to settlement statements as the first sentence affords offers
and compromises.124 However, specific statements of fact raise "problems of a
ll 8Brazil, supra note 6, at 966.
119Joint Statement by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence and the Standing
Committee of the Judicial Conference on Rules of Practice and Procedure, to Senator
James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on H.R.
5463 Before the Senate Committee on the ludiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 53,59 (1974), quoted
in 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 8, § 170, at 447 & n.10.
120 United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Olympia Wings, Inc., 896 F.2d 949,
956 (5th Cir. 1990) (trial court did not err in admitting evidence of settlement to show
change in witness' position after his deposition had been taken) (citation omitted); see
also Robert W. Lucas, Review of Selected 1987 California Legislation, 19 PAc. L.J. 610, 610
(1988) ("[Elvidence of compromise offers is admissible when that evidence is designed
to prove a matter at issue other than liability.")(footnote omitted)(discussing Cal. Evid.
Code sec. 1152(a), which, in similar fashion to Fed. R. Evid. 408, renders settlement
evidence "inadmissible" to prove liability).
12 1Michaels, supra note 8, at 37.
122 Brazil, supra note 6, at 967.
123 Rule 408, supra note 1.
124 See Michaels, supra note 8, at 36 ('The word likewise' refers back to the restrictions
on offers of compromise contained in the first sentence of Rule 408. Thus, statements
made in compromise negotiations are excluded on the same basis as the offers
themselves."); see also Brazil, supra note 6, at 995 ("The compromise in the rule consists
of the decision to make settlement communications inadmissible only for limited
purposes... clearly leaving open the possibility that courts could admit this same kind
of evidence for any of a large number of purposes."); cf. Okla. Stats. Ann. tit. 12, § 2408
(evidence statute otherwise identical with Fed. R. Evid. 408 has, inter alia, omitted





different nature,"125 and therefore an analogy with offers "does not... seem to
be well-founded."126 Factual statements are much more specific and may have
a higher relevance than the mere fact of an offer.127 They can thus be more
versatile in their utility, for example in showing individual elements relevant
to the validity of a claim, without directly addressing the purposes forbidden
in the rule's first sentence.128 If used as evidence tending to detract from the
credibility of a witness that has testified to an ultimate fact, settlement
statements would arguably become evidence of validity of the claim.129
However, the limited standard of the rule's first sentence, if mechanically
applied to the second sentence, would not operate to require exclusion of such
evidence.130
Prior to enactment of Rule 408, evidence of unqualified factual statements
in compromise negotiations was admissible for any purpose.131 In attempting
to broaden the scope of protection to settlement statements, the drafters of Rule
408 therefore lacked the guidance of applicable case law. Their technical
solution failed to address the unique problems posed by statements of fact 132
and the result is a gap, or gray area, not expressly covered by the rule's first
sentence.133 It has been suggested that the drafters' stated policy134 should be
given effect in this gray area, so as to exclude evidence of settlement statements
12523 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5308, at 246.
126 d. at 245.
127See id. at 246.
128See id. at 247.
129See id. at 240.
130The Davidson court suggested that evidence of a settlement statement regarding a
pivotal fact (the distance between plaintiff and the stampeding steer) could be admitted
to challenge the credibility of plaintiff's testimony in court. See Davidson v. Princesupra
note 3, at 1233 n.9.
13 1See, e.g., SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 8, at 188 ('In most common law
jurisdictions, a line is drawn between offers to settle and admissions of fact during
settlement negotiations. Factual admissions can be introduced against the party making
the admissions unless they are inextricably bound up with offers to settle.").
132See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
133 See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5308, at 248: The [Advisory
Committee's] Note says that the purpose of the second sentence is to
enhance "freedom of communication" and to eliminate disputes "over
whether a given statement falls within or without the protected area."
Neither of these goals will be fostered by reading the word "likewise" in
the second sentence as requiring technical adherence to the language
of the first sentence.
Id. (footnote omitted).
134See advisory committee's note, supra notes 9 & 114.
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if admission could discourage parties from entering compromise
negotiations.135
C. Third Sentence: Otherwise Discoverable Evidence
The last two sentences of Rule 408 state that the rule "does not require the
exclusion"136 of "otherwise discoverable" 137 evidence, and evidence "offered
for another purpose 138 than the three established in the first sentence. A strict
reading of the first sentence would tend to render the last two superfluous.
Therefore deletion was suggested as early as 1970,139 and at least two states,
Florida140 and Maine, 141 have left them out of their state versions of Rule 408.
The third sentence was added to the original draft by the Senate Committee
to allay government fears that in disputes with citizens, facts conceded in
negotiations otherwise could be "immunized" from discovery.142 Its language
has been characterized as "redundant"143 and "poorly chosen,"144 and its
meaning "obscure"14 5 and "unclear; it seems to state what the law would be if
135 See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5308, at 248.
136 Rule 408, supra note 1.
13 71d.
138 /d.
13 9See N.Y. Trial Lawyers, Recommendation and Study of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence 25 (1970), reprinted in 2 P.L.I., FED. CIV. PRAc. 4TH 287(1972), quoted in 23 WRIGHT
& GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5314, at 279 n.2 (suggesting deletion "since the first sentence
of the rule clearly sets forth the limited purpose for which such evidence is
inadmissible.").
14 0See FLA. STAT. ANN. EVID. CODE § 90.408, quoted in 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note
13, at 408-48.
141See ME. REV. STAT. ANN., ME R. EvID., 408, quoted in 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note
13, at 408-48 to 408-49. The Maine rule further provides that "[Elvidence of conduct or
statements made in compromise negotiations is also not admissible on any substantive
issue in dispute between the parties." Id. However, the Adviser's Note states that
settlement evidence "may be admissible for another purpose, such as tending to show
bias or prejudice of a witness." Id.
14 2See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5301, at 161 (noting that government
lawyers feared the rule might allow a taxpayer to recant her admission "without fear of
impeachment," and possibly immunize previously disclosed documents); cf. Report of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, reprinted in SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 8,
at 196, 197.
1432 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 8, § 170, at 448.
144 1d.
1451d. at 448-49 n.15 (quoting memorandum prepared by Professor Cleary, Comments




it were omitted."146 Commentators have found that Rule 408 provides minimal,
if any, protection of settlement evidence from discovery.147
D. Fourth Sentence: Offered for Another Purpose
Rule 408's last sentence reaffirms the first sentence, by providing that the
rule "does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another
purpose"148 than to prove liability for a claim, its invalidity or its amount.149 It
then lists purposes "such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing
a contention of undue delay,150 or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution."151 Although the drafters proposed that the three
situations listed were "illustrative,"1 52 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
has indicated that the list is exclusive, 153 and the Fifth Circuit that it "must be
146Maine Adviser's Note, Rule 408, quoted in 2 WEINSTEN ET AL, supra note 13, at
408-49.
147See Brazil, supra note 6; Kerwin, supra note 11.
148 See Rule 408, supra note 1.
14 9But see discussion of "gray area" not covered by first sentence due to lacking
analogy between offers and statements of fact, supra notes 124-30 and accompanying
text.
150 See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5312, at 269-73 (noting that the Advisory
Committee cited a single sentence from Dean Wigmore as authority for this usage at
common law; that it was supported by a single American case; that the language was
ill-chosen; and that the Advisory Committee's intent regarding evidence of settlement
statements offered to explain delay is unclear); see also 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note
8, § 172, at 477 (discussing "negativing a contention of undue delay").
151Rule 408, supra note 1. For a consideration of the ultimate permissible provision,
see 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5313, at 273-79 (noting, interalia, that its scope
and rationale are uncertain; that it may be rooted in common law reluctance to plea
bargaining; and that contemporary courts will have little difficulty in distinguishing
bonafide compromises from schemes designed to obstruct a criminal prosecution). See
also 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 8, § 172, at 471-77 (indicating that traditionally,
an attempt by an accused to offer compensation to the victim to refrain from pressing
charges was considered a crime in itself, with the victim as the new offender. However,
since contemporary courts view such private arrangements more favorably, they should
be protected by Rule 408, at least when the offenses involved are minor and
property-related).
152 See advisory committee's note, supra note 9; cf. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
8, § 5302, at 176 n.63 (observing that Rule 408's list of permissible uses is "strangely
incomplete.").
153 See Vincent v. Louis Marx & Co., Inc., 874 F.2d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 1989)(noting that the
last sentence of the Rule "neither states nor suggests that unfair prejudice would be a
ground for avoiding the prohibitions of the Rule.")(in products liability action, trial court
properly excluded evidence, offered by plaintiff, of amount of defendant tricycle
manufacturer's settlement with motorist in prior trial); see also Gladstone, supra note 12,
at S246 (proposing that the "otherpurposes" should be limited to "rebuttingan allegation
or attacking credibility"); cf. BROOM, supra note 47, at 443 ("Expressio unius est Exclusio
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balanced against the policy of encouraging settlements."154 Commentators
have pointed out that evidence falling within one of the categories still will be
subject to the other Federal Rules of Evidence. 155
E. Central Provision: Proving Bias or Prejudice of a Witness
This note focuses on the provision that sets evidence offered to prove bias or
prejudice outside the scope of Rule 408, since it was basis for the Davidson15 6
court's dicta regarding the admissibility of prior inconsistent statement to
impeach plaintiff in that case.157
First, it is critical to emphasize the distinction between proving a witness'
bias and impeaching a witness by a prior inconsistent statement.158 The former
is described as "an attack by a showing that the witness is biased on account of
emotional influences such as kinship for one party or hostility to another, or
motives of pecuniary interest, whether legitimate or corrupt."1 59 The latter,
"probably the most effective and most frequently employed, is an attack by
proof that the witness on a previous occasion has made statements inconsistent
alterius (Co. Litt. 210 a.) The express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
another.").
1 54 Ramada Dev. Co. v. Rauch, 644 F.2d 1097, 1107 (5th Cir. 1981)(in action brought
by developer to recover balance due from motel owner, an architect's report used as a
tool in unsuccessful compromise attempt was properly excluded under Rule 408); see
also Fiberglass Insulators, Inc. v. Dupuy, 856 F.2d 652, 655 (4th Cir. 1988)(holding that
exclusion based on public policy was proper, since "[Tihe fact that offering an item of
evidence is not in terms barred by Rule 408 does not make it otherwise admissible)(in
an antitrust suit against former business associate, settlement statements by attorneys
in prior related litigation between theparties were properly excluded, even though
plaintiff claimed they were offered for other purposes than proving liability); cf. Blakely,
supra note 8, at 237 ("[T]he breadth of the phrase 'for another purpose' will require courts
to determine how far to extend this use before it bumps into the policy of rule 408.").
1 55See GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 117 (1987) ("[I1n any case in which
compromise-related evidence is offered on theory of relevancy not presented by Rule
408, Rule 403 may operate to exclude the evidence where the probative value is low and
the risk of prejudice or confusion is substantial.") (footnote omitted); 23 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5311, at 261 n.2 ('The last sentence of Rule 408 says 'This rule
does not require exclusion.. .,' clearly implying that other rules may."); 2 LouISELL &
MUELLER, supra note 8, § 170, at 443 (noting that "often Rule 403 and the underlying
policy of Rule 408 require exclusion even when a permissible purpose can be
discerned."); cf. Brazil, supra note 6, at 967 ("[T]he policies that inspire rule 408 are so
important that courts should interpret the scope of its protection liberally and should
resolve doubts about its scope by refusing to admit evidence from settlement
negotiations.").
156 Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1991), cert. denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah
1991); see supra note 3.
15 71d.
158 See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5311, at 265.




with his present testimony."160 Dean Wigmore apparently distinguished themethods as belonging to two distinct classifications of impeachment; theformer a deductive form, and the latter an empiric form of impeachment.161The distinction between the two is especially critical when seen in connectionwith the gap, or gray area, opened between the first and second sentences ofRule 408,162 and since there is a tendency to extrapolate incorrectly that Rule408's provision for evidence of witness bias embraces impeachment ingeneral.163
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that there was no need toaddress the distinct issue of using prior inconsistent settlement statements toimpeach a party at common law, since unqualified statements of fact wereadmissible for any purpose, including as evidence of liability.164 As a result,the drafters of Rule 408 were unable to foresee the implications of adding thesecond sentence that developed into the current controversy addressed by this
note.165
Finally, as with the other two provisions of the rule's last sentence,166 Rule408's provision for evidence of witness bias is based on the common-law
1601d. at 72.
1613A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 874, at 638-40 (JamesH. Chadbourn rev., 1970).
162 See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
163 See PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS ANDMAGISTRATES 126.1 (2d ed. 1994). Compare 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5311,at 265 & nn.26, 30 (remarking that failure to observe the distinction "is probably due tothe loose application of the label 'impeachment' to the use of the evidence to show bias,"and commenting that 'Professor Rothstein consistently refers to this provision aspermitting the use of the evidence for 'impeachment"') with Paul F. Rothstein, TheProposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 CEO. L.J. 125, at 127-28 n.13(19 73 )(possibly reflecting the origin of his view when, in commenting on "(sleveralambiguities" that existed in the Nov. 1972 draft of Fed. R. Evid. 407, 408, and 411, hesuggested that those rules contained "varying terms for similar thoughts").164 See advisory committee's note, Rule 408, supra note 9;seealso23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 8, § 5314, at 283.165 1t has been proposed that the Advisory Committee, in itsJoint Statement with theStanding Committee of the Judicial Conference on Rules of Practice and Procedure, seesupra note 119 and accompanying text, when it was allaying government concerns thatRule 408 would encourage misrepresentations during compromise negotiations,somehow indicated support for an across-the-board admission of impeachmentevidence. See 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 8, § 170, at 447-48 ("In other words, Rule408 does not bar statements in settlement talks when offered to impeach at trial."). Butsee 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5314, at 285 (contending that the language inquestion-fearing that "encouragement" will result from "eliminating responsibility" formaking misrepresentations-'looks more like a calculated effort to obscure the issuethan an endorsement of use of negotiation statements for impeachmentpurposes.")(footnotes omitted).
166See supra notes 150, 151.
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experience with compromise evidence, and therefore reflects its sharp
distinction between the fact of the offer and statements of fact expressed during
negotiations. Consequently, all the cases in the annotation cited in the Advisory
Committee's Note167 deal with the following situation, representing the "vast
bulk" 168 of the pre-408 cases:
[O]ne party calls a witness to testify in his behalf and on
cross-examination the opponent wishes to show that the witness and
the party calling him have entered into a compromise of a related
claim. If one applies a hearsay analysis to such cases, admissibility
results because the act of the party in compromising the claim is not
being offered to show an implied assertion on his part as to the validity
of that claim; instead the compromise is offered to show its effect on
the state of mind of the witness.
169
When applied to Rule 408, this line of reasoning contrasts the showing of
witness bias from an offer to prove liability or invalidity of the claim in the
following fashion: Since it is the mere fact of the compromise in the related
claim that is used to show that the witness in the instant case is biased, no
inference regarding the liability or invalidity of the compromised related claim
is required.170
The admissibility of compromise evidence to show witness bias at common
law was most likely intended to prevent parties from using settlements as
shields to secretly obtain favorable witness testimony.171 However, as with the
provision placing efforts to obstruct criminal prosecutions outside the scope of
Rule 408's protection, 172 such schemes today would not qualify as bona fide
settlements of disputed claims and would hence fall outside the scope of the
rule altogether. The original impetus behind the provision has thus been
diminished since Rule 408 was first introduced.
Furthermore, commentators suggest that the rationale and utility of the
witness bias provision logically do not apply to a witness who is also a party
in the case,173 since "the party's interest is apparent [and thus] the need for
167See advisory committee's note, supra note 9.




172 See supra note 151.
173 See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5311, at 264 ("The interest of the party in
the outcome is so obvious and the relevance of his compromise with a third person to
a showing of bias against his opponent so weak that it is difficult to see how a proper
application of Rule 403 would ever permit its use.") (footnote omitted). But see
McCoRMICK, supra note 91, § 274, at 813 ("This impeachment of party-witnesses,





additional evidence on credibility is less."174 Finally, "[w]here the witness
sought to be impeached is a party to the litigation, the danger for prejudice is
substantial,"175 and the possibility of exclusion pursuant to Rule 403176 is
considerably heightened.
IV. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 408: REVIEW OF APPLICABLE CASES
The preceding analysis of Rule 408's provision for placing settlement
evidence offered to show witness bias outside the scope of its protection
demonstrates that the provision cannot be used convincingly as an authority
in support for admitting evidence of a party's prior inconsistent settlement
statements for impeachment purposes. This conclusion is in accord with the
applicable case law.
A survey of some representative cases yields the following impressions:
A. The only court that has considered the issue of impeaching
a party by prior inconsistent settlement statements has
rejected the notion based on public policies. The courts that
have found statements admissible for various purposes
have not directly addressed the issue.
B. Courts tend to provide statements with broad protection
under Rule 408 if it is established that the statements were
part of compromise negotiations. Where attempts to show
the existence of compromise negotiations fail, courts
commonly find Rule 408 inapplicable, and generally admit
the statements.
C. Cases involving efforts to demonstrate witness bias
generally follow the common-law tradition that evidence of
the fact of settlement is introduced, rather than evidence of
specific settlement statements. However, evidence offered
to show bias is still subject to discretionary exclusion based
on other evidence rules and the public policy behind Rule
408.
A. Impeaching Party by Prior Inconsistent Statement
The only court that has addressed this question directly is the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in EEOC v. Gear Petroleum.177 Following
1 74 MCCoRMIcK, supra note 91, § 274, at 813.
1 7 5 WEISSENBERGER, supra note 155, at 117.
176Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on
Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time, provides: "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
177948 F.2d 1542 (10th Cir. 1991), supra note 7.
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an extensive survey of commentators that oppose such impeachment, the court
found that the trial court properly excluded settlement statements offered to
impeach the defendants, noting that the policy behind the rule weighed against
admission, and that the proffer "was but a thinly veiled attempt to get the
'smoking gun' letter before the jury."178 An attempt by defendant to introduce
plaintiff's settlement with third party defendant in Williams v. Chevron USA,
Inc.,179 in order to impeach plaintiff's testimony that he could not afford
surgery, was rejected by the trial court based on the theory that it related to the
amount of the settlement and therefore was inadmissible under Rule 408. The
Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion after weighing the possibility of jury
confusion under Rule 403.
The cases discovered that admit settlement statements are not directly on
point and in most cases do not directly involve a party witness. However, one
such case was used by the Davidson180 court as the main authority in support
of the contention that impeachment of a party by a prior inconsistent statement
was allowed under Rule 408.181 In a narrow reading of Rule 408, the Fifth
Circuit found that the trial court properly permitted defendant's counsel to
elicit evidence on redirect from defendant's mechanic about a settlement
between himself and the plaintiff in order to rehabilitate him as a witness, since
Rule 408 "permits settlement evidence for any purpose except to prove or
disprove liability or the amount of the claim."182
In a similar vein, the catchall "another purpose" provision in Rule 408's
fourth sentence was generously applied in Urico v. Parnell Oil Co.,183 Freidus v.
First Nat'l Bank,184 and Eisenberg v. University of New Mexico.185
B. Admissibility of Statements in "Compromise Negotiations"
Increasingly, the evidentiary threshold for settlement statements involves
determining whether the statements were made in "compromise negotiations"
or not. An affirmative answer generally provides shelter under Rule 408's
178 d. at 1546.
179875 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1989).
18 0See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
181U.S. Aviation Underwriters v. Olympia Wings, Inc., 896 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1990).
1821d. at 956 (citation omitted).
183708 F.2d 852, 855 (1st Cir. 1983) (settlement statements were admitted to show
defendant's insurer refused to make a reasonable settlement offer).
184928 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1991)(settlement letters between the parties' attorneys were
properly admitted to negate a contention of undue delay by plaintiff, thereby effectively
rebutting testimony of plaintiff's agent/husband).
185936 F.2d 1131, 1134 (10th Cir. 1991)(plaintiff's attorney's affidavit to the court
requesting settlement conference was properly admitted for purpose of determining a
Rule 11 violation; the Tenth Circuit found that the attorney waived Rule 408 protection




second sentence, 186 while statements not found to fall within the protected
category almost automatically are denied protective status. This was the
dispositive issue in Davidson v. Prince;187 plaintiff's letter to defendant's insurer
was admitted "because the letter was not an offer to compromise [his] claim,
nor was it written as part of settlement negotiations.
'188
At least seven circuits have adopted a functional approach189 to the question;
if the statement was intended to be part of compromise negotiations, then it is
granted protection by Rule 408's shield. Thus in Ramada Dev. Co. v. Rauch,190
an architect's report commissioned by plaintiff was found to have been
intended to function as a basis for compromise negotiations, since it "would
not have existed but for the negotiations,"19 1 and was therefore properly
excluded from trial. Quoting a treatise, the Fifth Circuit coined the intent test:
"[Tlhe question under the rule is 'whether the statements or conduct were
intended to be part of the negotiations toward compromise." 192
The Ramada test was applied in Affiliated Mfrs., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of
America,193 Blu-J, Inc. v. Kempter C.P.A. Group,'94 Fiberglass Insulators, Inc. v.
Dupuy,195 and Kritikos v. Palmer Johnson, Inc..19 6 Intent tests were also applied,
186See supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text for discussion regarding the gap
created in Rule 408 between its first and second sentences.
18 7See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
188 Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225,1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
18 9See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, sec. 5307, at 231 (contrasting the functional
approach with a temporal-event approach that determines first whether negotiations
took place, then whether statements were made during that time):
The functional view is likely to be used by courts that have inter-
preted 'compromise negotiations' to refer to a state of mind rather
than an event. Such courts will ask if the speaker was seeking to
reach a compromise, then exclude the statement if it was germane to
that purpose.
Id.
190644 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1981); see supra note 154 and accompanying text.
1911d. at 1107.
192 1d. at 1106 (quoting 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 408[03],
at 408-21 (1980)).
19356 F.3d 521 (3d Cir. 1995)(internal memoranda intended as base's for compromise
negotiation were properly excluded.) The court also used an event-oriented approach.
See supra note 189.
194916 F.2d 637,642 (11th Cir. 1990)(an evaluation of defendant's accounting methods
prepared by mutual agreement between the parties was properly excluded, since it was
"intended to be part of negotiations toward compromise... ").
195856 F.2d 652, 653, 655 (4th Cir. 1988)(statements by attorneys in "acrimonious
dispute of long standing between two former business associates" were properly
excluded as part of an ongoing settlement process through a string of lawsuits, based
on the parties' intent and "the strong public policy favoring exclusion"); see supra note
154 and accompanying text.
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without citing Ratnada,197 in Raybestos Prods. Co. v. Younger,198 Trebor Sportswear
Co. v. The Ltd. Stores, Inc.,199 and Trans Union Credit Infor v. Associated Credit
Services.200 Three cases illustrating an event-oriented approach201 are S.A.
Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewage Dist.,202 Winchester Packaging, Inc. v. Mobil
Chemical Co. 203 and Pierce v. FR. Tripler & Co..204 The classification of statements
as not being part of compromise negotiation deprived them of Rule 408's
196821 F.2d 418,423 (7th Cir. 1987)(holding that trial court committed harmless error
in admitting correspondence between plaintiff and his owner's representative because
the letters were written "with the objectiveof advising plaintiff of a possible compromise
solution before legal action was commenced").
197See supra note 154.
19854 F.3d 1234 (7th Cir. 1995) (in defamation action defendant's letter in response to
plaintiff's earlier utter threatening to sue was admitted as evidence of intimidation, and
was not found to have been intended as a settlement attempt). The court also used an
event-oriented approach. See supra note 189.
199865 F.2d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 1989)(letter from defendant referring to current issues
between the parties was properly excluded because the court concluded that the
"documents were intended (at least in part) to settle the claims of contractual breach").
200805 F.2d 188,192 (6th Cir. 1986)(plaintiff's alleged repudiation of service agreement
was properly excluded since the statements were made at a meeting designed "to get
together.and talk about our interpretation of the contract" and because the parties'
counsel indicated "their belief that the discussions were indeed settlement
negotiations").
20 1See supra note 189.
20250 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1995) (statement by defendant's engineer that plaintiff's claim
probably had merit was properly admitted, since claim had not yet been rejected, and
there were no compromise negotiations.)
20314 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1994)(plaintiff's letters demanding payment and threatening
litigation were held properly excluded since they constituted an inducement to avoid
legal costs and since the policy of Rule 408 discourages the common-law requirement
to clothe statements in hypothetical form). Faced with a similar scenario in Davidson v.
Prince, the Court of Appeals of Utah held oppositely, and admitted the statements as
non-settlement evidence. 813 P.2d 1225,1233 (Utah App. 1991) ("Furthermore, appellant
in the letter demands payment in full of appellant's claim and its whole tenor is that
appellant will not compromise one bit.")(footnote omitted).
204955 F.2d 820, 829 (2d Cir. 1992)(in former employee's age discrimination suit,
evidence of defendant's job offer was properly excluded when offered to show
defendant's state of mind, since the determinative question was whether "defendant
was motivated by impermissible factors," and thus the offer represented "evidence on
the merits of the case," tending to go to liability and invalidityof the claim). This rationale
could arguably apply to Davidson v. Prince since the distance between plaintiff and the
steer constituted evidence on the merits of the case, and defendant's chief theory of
contributory negligence was that plaintiff cornered the "escaped





protection in Hanson v. Waller205 and Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.. 206
C. Proving Bias of Witness by Fact of Settlement
As the following cases demonstrate, there is no automatic admission for
evidence of settlement to show bias of a witness, even though Rule 408
expressly places that purpose outside the scope of its protective shield. The
court may still, in its discretion, exclude such evidence based on other evidence
rules such as Rule 403, or on the public policy behind Rule 408.
One such example is Myers v. Pennzoil,20 7 where defendant, a valve
manufacturer in a wrongful death suit arising from an oil rig accident,
unsuccessfully sought to introduce evidence that plaintiff's witnesses were
former defendants that had settled with plaintiff, in order to show their bias
and prejudice. The Fifth Circuit held that the exclusion was not an abuse of
discretion since the trial court "was concerned about jury confusion 20 8 and had
otherwise "afforded defendant wide latitude in conducting his
cross-exanination."2 09
However, an indemnity agreement between co-defendants in Brocklesby v.
United States210 was properly admitted in a tort action brought by plane crash
survivors against the United States and a publisher of an instrument approach
chart, where plaintiffs intended to show a nonadverse relationship existed
between the defendants and, in addition, to attack the credibility of their
witnesses. The Ninth Circuit found the evidence of the agreement relevant
"because it tends to make their respective positions less credible. 211
A reluctant Fifth Circuit found that no harmful error in the trial court's
exclusion of evidence of a "Mary Carter"212 agreement in Reichenbach v.
205888 F.2d 806,813-14 (11th Cir. 1989) (correspondence between the parties' counsel
in a wrongful death action arising from traffic accident containing the words "[I1f you
care to discuss the matter with me, please feel free to call" was properly admitted as an
admission of a party opponent since "there's nothing said in that letter about
compromise").
206561 F.2d 1365, 1368, 1372-73 (10th Cir. 1977) (statements in communications
between parties in a trademark infringement suit were properly admitted as "simply
business communications" since the discussions "had not crystallized to the point of
threatened litigation," even though defendant told plaintiff that if he sued, "the case
would be in litigation long enough that Goodyear might obtain all the benefits it desired"
from the disputed product name).
207889 F.2d 1457 (5th Cir. 1989).
208 Id. at 1461.
209 Id.
210767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986).
2 111d. at 1292-93 n.2.
2 12 A "Mary Carter" agreement is a contract '"by which one co-defendant secretly
agrees with the plaintiff that, if such defendant will proceed to defend himself in court,
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Smith,213 emphasizing that its affirmance was "not to be considered an approval
... of the trial court's approach."214 In a negligence suit against the pilot of a
boat that collided with a boat carrying the plaintiff, a passenger, the defendant
offered evidence of a settlement between plaintiff and a former defendant in
order to attack the plaintiff's credibility. Possible reasons for the trial court's
exclusion of the settlement evidence were the jury's prior knowledge of the
relationship between the plaintiff and the settling defendant ("her friend and
escort")215 and plaintiff's status as litigant; "her inherent interest in the outcome
of the litigation may have been too manifest to require further proof through
impeachment."216
V. ANALYSIS
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 408: The Gap Left Open in its Structure
Since the drafters of Rule 408 were unable to anticipate the current
controversy over whether a party's prior inconsistent settlement statements
offered for impeachment should benefit from the rule's protective reach,217
they left open a gap in its structure,218 neither explicitly including such practice
within its scope, nor excluding it.219 Moreover, "courts have not formulated a
consistent, reliable body of doctrine to determine the extent to which Rule 408
bars evidence of pretrial offers or statements made during negotiations 220
when offered for this purpose, even though it is "[olne of the most common
forms of impeachment."22 1 Though it has been proposed that such use of
settlement statements is "unlikely,"22 2 since most negotiations will be done by
his own maximum liability will be diminished proportionately by increasing the liability
of the other co-defendants." Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385, 387 (Fla. 1973), quoted in
Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1976). The term originates from Booth v.
Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So.2d 8 (Fla. App. 1967).




217 See supra notes 5-15 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
219 See Brazil, supra note 6, at 959 ('The language of Rule 408 unfortunately leaves a
great deal of uncertainty about the rule."); cf. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 460
("[Ilmpeachment is not specifically included as illustrative of such other purposes in
Rule 408, although it is so included in Rule 407. The federal courts have yet to address
this question.").
2 20 Brazil, supra note 6, at 974.
22 1Id.; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 160.




attorneys,223 its potential for turning into a trap for the unwary layman is
amply illustrated by the Davidson224 case.
B. The Vacuum Puts the Entire Rule in Jeopardy
The gap between Rule 408's first and second sentence, coupled with an
incorrect inference from its fourth sentence, 225 has led an occasional court to
conclude that it "recognizes an exception to the policy 226 when settlement
evidence is "admitted for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of the
party. 22 7 However, commentators warn that such use, if sanctioned, has the
potential to "undercut,"228 "eviscerate,"229 or "destroy"23 0 the rule. One concern
is that it would "allow evidence perilously close to the key issue of liability,"23 1
such as "camouflaged causation evidence."232 It could also possibly be used as
2231d.
2 2 4 See supra note 3 (layman plaintiff, without counsel at the time, stated a crucial fact
in a letter to defendant's insurer, which later was admitted at trial with devastating
impact); see also Waltz & Huston, supra note 8, at 16 ("If the door is opened to
impeachment of a party on the basis of concessions made at the bargaining table,
sophisticated negotiators will revert to their old arguendo phraseology, and only the
unwary will be subjected to later discrediting.").
225See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
226 Estate of Spinosa, 621 F.2d 1154, 1158 (1st Cir. 1980) (in a wrongful death action
against a truck manufacturer, evidence of prior pleadings was properly excluded since
there was no inconsistency with present pleadings).
227ld.
228SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 8, at 191.
229 Michaels, supra note 8.
2 30Green, supra note 8.
2 31Making Sense, supra note 13, at 1348 (footnote omitted); cf. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 8, § 5314, at 284 (debating Judge Sam Pointer's comment, supra note 8):
A federal judge has argued that [settlement] statements are admissible
to impeach, apparently on the theory that the use of the statement for
impeachment purposes does not involve proof of liability or invalidity
"substantively." This analysis is not very convincing unless one takes the
view that the rule does not forbid the use of compromise evidence to
prove an evidentiary fact that tends to prove liability. Moreover, it
seems to rest on analogy to the hearsay rule and its distinction between
"substantive" evidence and "impeachment," which is not wholly apt in
the present context.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
2 32McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240,248 (1st Cir. 1985)(in a products liability case
against a motorcycle manufacturer, appellate court found lower court committed a
prejudicial error in admitting a release obtained by defendant to impeach plaintiff's
testimony regarding cause of injury).
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"a mere subterfuge to get before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible."233
Consequently, one state has added a provision to its version of Rule 408 that
reads: "Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations
is also not admissible on any substantive issue in dispute between the
parties.,,234
It has also been warned that if settlement statements are admitted at trial,
"many attorneys would be forced to testify as to the nature of discussions and
thus be disqualified as trial counsel."235 Moreover, "the almost unavoidable
impact of disclosure about compromises is that juries will consider the
evidence as a concession of liability,"' 23 6 and "the tendency of juries to disregard
instructions is so well known that the admission of the evidence for even a
limited purpose would result in a frustration of the policy of encouraging
settlements."23
7
The original intent behind Rule 408 was to encourage compromise and
ensure freedom of communication in compromise negotiations.238 It has been
noted that its limited scope may be necessary to prevent abuses, but that its
"exceptions cannot be so expanded as to promote abuse of the settlement
process."239 The rule in its present form, by not clearly protecting
compromising parties from being impeached by prior inconsistent statements,
is allowing "reserve and dissimulation, uneasiness, suspicion and fear into
negotiations,"240 and is incapable of fulfilling its mandate to promote
compromise and settlements.
C. Public Policy is Better Served with an Amended Rule
Although "judicial rulemaking [has] been generally regarded as the right
way to deal with the subject matter of evidence,"241 the "unpredictability of
233 United States v. Grooms, 978 F.2d 425, 429 (8th Cir. 1992)(in a sexual abuse case
not involving Rule 408, no error was committed where trial court excluded prior
inconsistent statements offered to impeach government witness)(citation omitted).
234 ME. R. EVID. 408 (1985), quoted in 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW 8 (Walter A. Reiser, Jr. Supp. 1986); cf. Pierce v. F.R. Tripler & Co., supra
note 201.
235 pierce, 955 F.2d at 828.
236 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, 1 408[05], 408-37; cf. 3 DAVID W. LOUISELL &
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 8, § 356, at 553 (1979) ("[Tlhe
risk is high in this circumstance that the jury will misuse the statement as proof of the
fact it asserts .... ")(footnote omitted).
23 7John P. Fomey, Jr., Evidence: Settlement and Compromise; Admissibility for
Impeachment Purposes, 27 TEX. L. REV. 555, 557 (1949).
238Advisory committee's note, Rule 408, supra note 9.
23 9 Gladstone, supra note 12, at S242.
240Bell, supra note 17, at 257.




judicial rulings"242 in the area of Rule 408 warrants legislative action to adjust
a minor defect, in order to enable the rule to better serve the purpose it was
designed for. It is the intent behind, and not the letter of, the rule that represents
the drafters' true accomplishment, and which should be kept in high regard.243
It is clear that the rule has not lived up to its expectations,2 44 and negotiating
parties cannot always depend on courts giving it a liberal interpretation.245
This author therefore proposes that Rule 408 be amended with the following
language from Alaska's version of the rule added to its fourth sentence: "[B]ut
exclusion is required where sole purpose for offering the evidence is to impeach
a party by showing a prior inconsistent statement."246
242 Brazil, supra note 6, at 1029.
243Cf., e.g., BROOM, supra note 47, at 466 ("Qui haeret in Litera Haeret in Cortice. (Co. Litt.
283 b.) He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin-deep into its
meaning."); id. at 463 ("Contemporanea Expositioest optima etfortissima in Lege. (2 Inst. 11.)
The best and surest mode of construing an instrument is to read it in the sense which
would have been applied when it was drawn up."); Quinnipiac Coun. v. Commission
on Human Rights, 528 A.2d 352, 357 (Conn. 1987)("When we are faced with ambiguity
in a statute, however, we turn for interpretive guidance to its legislative history, the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, and the purpose the statute is to
serve.")(citation omitted).
2 44 For expectations contemporary with drafting, see Schmertz, supra note 38, at 17
("[Tihe rule changes the law in one important respect by enlarging the rule of exclusion.
Rule 408 excludes not only the offer or settlement itself, but, in addition any otherwise
admissible express admissions of fact made during compromise negotiations."); see also
Moore & Bendix, supra note 72, at 19 ("As a matter of elementary fairness, what people
say in the course of settlement discussions should not be used against them.... The
Court Rule would better promote these goals .... '). But see 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 8, § 5307, at 237 ("Until decisions of the courts have clarified the rule, it seems best
to assume that 'freedom of communication' in negotiations has not been significantly
altered.").
24 5Cf. Brazil, supra note 6, at 967 ("[Tlhe policies that inspire rule 408 are so important
that courts should interpret the scope of its protection liberally .... "); 2 LOUISELL &
MUELLER, supra note 8, § 171, at 456 ("Rule 408 should be generously construed to require
exclusion of statements made during negotiations so that even the most cautious lawyer
need not continue to follow the old habit [of hypothetical terms]"); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1410 ("Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretanur. ..
Statutes made for the public good ought to be liberally construed."). But see Davidson v.
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1991), supra note 3.
246ALASKA R. EVID. 408 (R Pamph. 1979), quoted in SPENCER A. GARD & CLIFFORD S.
FISHMAN, 2 JONES ON EVIDENCE, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 13B:3, at 253 (6th ed. Supp. 1994).
Tennessee has adopted a similar provision. See id. ("[A] party may not be impeached by
a prior inconsistent statement made in compromise negotiations."). See also Laird C.
Kirkpatrick, Reforming Evidence Law in Oregon, 59 OR. L. REV. 43, 66-67 (1980)("Rule 408
does not clearly preclude an admission made during negotiations from being used for
impeachment purposes .... If the rule is truly to further open negotiations, an
amendment is necessary"). Robert K. Harris, The Impeachnent Exception to Rule 407;
Limitations on the Introduction of Evidence of Subsequent Measures, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 901,
942 (1988)("A model for resolving these [impeachment] questions on the state level is
shown by the example of Alaska."); cf Green, supra note 8, at 36 ("Working for modest
amendment to Evidence Rule 408 to make it clear that the Rule excludes evidence of
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In their commentary, the Alaskan drafters emphasized the unique needs that
parties in compromise negotiations have for safety and reassurance before they
dare to let their guard down:
This further protection is required in order to encourage free and open
negotiations and to foster settlements. It may be necessary to "concede"
issues to an opponent to advance negotiations which are not issues that
one would readily concede for purposes of proving liability. If
impeachment is allowed, the common law requirement of
communicating in hypothetical terms would, for all practical
purposes, be reinstated. Unless the parties to the negotiation are
insured that they will not prejudice the merits of their respective cases,
communications will be guarded.
247
Compromise negotiations have similarities with peace talks between enemies.
The parties are opponents, and they are ambivalent about the process. 248 Fear
and mistrust will inhibit the process, as will any lingering threat of
repercussions for statements made.249 Free negotiations involve exchange of
ideas and suggestions, exploring each other's views, evolving thoughts and
perhaps changing viewpoints. In such a setting "it is extremely difficult to
articulate positions at different times that are completely consistent,"250
particularly because the main idea behind compromise negotiations is mutual
concession and surrendering former positions. If the parties are aware that all
they say or do during negotiations could be used against them for
impeachment purposes later, "they will retreat into a shell of secrecy and
non-communication in the pre-trial period, thus turning settlement
'negotiations' into little more than posturing and poker-playing."251 The
proposed amendment will allow the parties to "let their hair down and try to
reach settlement in a variety of ways"252 without having to watch their every
word.
compromises, offers to compromise, and statements made in connection with such
offers for substantive as well as impeachment purposes, would be a better legislative
agenda .... ").
247 Reprinted in 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, 91 408[08]1 at 408-47.
248 See supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
249 /d.
2 50Brazil, supra note 6, at 975.
2 511d.




D. The Amendment and the Truth-Finding Process
It has been proposed, with reference to Rule 102,253 that if a party could not
be impeached by prior inconsistent settlement statements, the truth would not
be fully "ascertained,"254 since the effect of barring the use of inconsistent
statements would be to "protect false representations."255 However, one
commentator surveying the issue concluded that "it is questionable whether
the narrower interpretation of the rule would contribute to the goal of deterring
or detecting perjury at trial or lying during settlement negotiations."256
Moreover, "attack by prior inconsistent statements has the weakness of being
indefinite: It indicates that the witness may have erred or lied, but not which
or why."257 Besides, the classic notion that the prior statement is "often
inherently more trustworthy than the testimony itself' 258 has been challenged
in the context of a trial following free-wheeling, but failed, negotiations.259
Finally, the degree of inconsistency required for impeachment is much lower
than outright lying; "any material variance between the testimony and the
previous statement will suffice."260 There is no way this variance can be
ascertained with certainty; "Is bias at work, or bad character, or a defect in
perception, memory or narrative ability or is it simple, human, error? 261
The questionable deterrence value of such impeachment, the uncertainty of
what it indicates, the low degree of inconsistency required, and its inability to
distinguish between innocent errors and deliberate lies indicate that protecting
a compromising party from impeachment by prior inconsistent statements
does not inhibit the truthfinding process to any considerable degree. This
becomes particularly clear when the facts that the "danger that the evidence
will be used substantively as an admission is greater,"262 and "the need for
additional evidence on credibility is less"263 (since the party's interest is
2 53 Fed. R. Evid. 102, Purpose and Construction, provides: "These rules shall be
construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that
the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EvID. 102.
254 See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5314, at 286 (noting that a party
impeached at trial, in the absence of mistake, was lying at one time or another).
255Id.
256 Brazil, supra note 6, at 957.
2573 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 236, § 356, at 546.
258MCCORMICK, supra note 91, § 34, at 75 (footnote omitted).
259Bell, supra note 17, at 251-52.
260MCCORMICK, supra note 91, § 34, at 74.
2613 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 236, § 356, at 546.
262MCCORMICK, supra note 91, § 274, at 813.
263Id.
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obvious), are weighed in on the other side of the scale, together with the strong
public policy of encouraging compromise.264
VI. CONCLUSION
In the final reckoning, it may be useful to inquire why the United States
Supreme Court,265 our common-law tradition, and the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Evidence all have promulgated the encouragement of compromise
and settlements. Commentators agree that the "policy objective is vital to the
survival of our court system, for if a large percentage of our cases did not settle,
the backlog in our courts would become totally intolerable."266 Rule 408
therefore occupies a position of crucial importance among the Federal Rules of
Evidence in particular, and in the entire American system of justice in general.
Since it directly advances the "elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay"267 more than perhaps any other provision and thereby contributes more
than its share "to the end that the truth may be ascertained,"268 we "should
guard against needless inquiry and concern over credibility factors, which
could well result in unnecessarily undercutting the basic exclusionary rule."26
9
The proposed amendment will stop the threatening erosion of Rule 408 that
is exemplified by the dicta in Davidson v. Prince270 and will enable it to regain
its potential in furthering the public policy of encouraging compromise and
settlements, which was exactly what the drafters intended.
264 Cf. Slough, supra note 69, at 721 ('Testing bias or interest of a witness is a legitimate
activity, but the trial judge should ever be aware thatneedless inquiry and concern over
credibility factors may spell dissolution of the basic rule of exclusion."). For similar
phrasing, see infra note 265 and accompanying text.
265Williams v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910) ("Compromises of disputed
claims are favored by the courts [citation] ... -), quoted in 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra
note 8, § 171, at 453 n.2.
266 Brazil, supra note 6, at 959; see also 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5315, at
294 ("Although the settlement of disputes is of some advantage to the parties and to
society at large, the real beneficiaries of a rule designed to encourage compromise are
courts with crowded dockets.")(footnote omitted); 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 8,
§ 171, at 453 (noting that private settlement is "an absolutely necessary factor in keeping
court congestion to manageable levels").
267Fed. R. Evid. 102, supra note 253.
268 Id.
26 9JAcK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL,
17.05[01], at 7-85 (1992).
270813 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1991), supra note 3.
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